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Abstract—We analyze sets of intrusion detection records 
observed on the networks of several large, nonresidential 
organizations protected by a form of intrusion detection and 
prevention service. Our analyses reveal that the process of 
intrusion detection in these networks exhibits a significant degree 
of burstiness as well as strong memory, with burstiness and 
memory properties that are comparable to those of natural 
processes driven by threshold effects, but different from bursty 
human activities. We explore time-series models of these 
observable network security incidents based on partially 
observed data using a hidden Markov model with restricted 
hidden states, which we fit using Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
techniques. We examine the output of the fitted model with 
respect to its statistical properties and demonstrate that the 
model adequately accounts for intrinsic “bursting” within 
observed network incidents as a result of alternation between two 
or more stochastic processes. While our analysis does not lead 
directly to new detection capabilities, the practical implications of 
gaining better understanding of the observed burstiness are 
significant, and include opportunities for quantifying a network’s 
risks and defensive efforts.  
 
Index Terms—bursty processes, cyber risk assessment, cyber 
security, estimating undetected malware, malware detection 
model, predictive models for cyber intrusions 
 
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
A. Motivation 
We explore approaches to modeling the detection process of 
cyber infections, i.e., presence of malicious software – 
malware – on a computer network. Often, this process is 
performed by a specialized organization – Managed Security 
Service Provider (MSSP) [1] – that monitors computer 
networks, analyzes the information obtained from the network, 
detects intrusions and activities of malware on the network, 
and reports such detections to the operators of the network 
who then take measures necessary to recover from the 
intrusion. As this research is based on empirical data provided 
to authors by a MSSP covering several large, non-residential 
networks, hereafter we use the term MSSP when referring to a 
network’s cyber defenders. 
For the purposes of this paper, we describe the process 
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executed by a MSSP organization in a limited and simplified 
fashion as follows: (1) the MSSP deploys one or more 
network sensors, i.e., hardware and software that collects 
information from the network traffic, on the computer network 
of its customer; (2) the sensor monitors the traffic to and from 
the customer’s network; (3) the sensor sends alerts and 
information captured from the network (possibly including 
full-packet capture of selected traffic) to the MSSP analysis 
facility; (4) the MSSP’s human analysts and automated 
analytical tools process the information arriving from the 
sensor; (5) when a MSSP  analyst, having analyzed the 
available information, concludes that malware is operating on 
the customer network, the analyst prepares an incident report 
and sends it to the customer’s network administrator as well as 
to pertinent authorities. Thus, the process of monitoring and 
analysis yields a series of incident reports each of which 
documents a detection of an infection. MSSP analysts strive to 
submit each report as soon as possible after detecting an 
infection.  
The major findings of this paper are that the timing of when 
the reports are filed is not random and uniformly distributed 
over an interval (i.e., a Poisson process) but instead exhibits 
significant burstiness, and furthermore that this burstiness can 
be modeled well by a simple two-state model. While this lends 
no new insight as to how to find novel intrusions, 
understanding and modeling the dynamics of burstiness in 
intrusion detection would help anticipate the variability of 
detections over time using established intrusion detection 
methods. One obvious benefit that would accrue from such a 
model, if calibrated for a given network, would be to enable a 
manager of MSSP operations to project the workload and 
allocate and schedule the efforts of cyber analysts and other 
resources in a more effective manner (compare with similar 
arguments in [2]). 
B. Malware Lifecycle 
To introduce key elements of the phenomena explored in 
this paper, we describe here the lifecycle of malware. For the 
purposes of this paper, the first event of interest in the 
lifecycle of malware is when a cyber attacker successfully 
deploys a malware on the network defended by a MSSP. 
Following the deployment, the malware and its controller 
begin executing activities, such as beaconing or downloading 
additional malware. 
If the MSSP possesses means such as a signature or a 
behavioral rule to detect the activities of the malware, the 
detection and removal of the malware typically occurs rapidly, 
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and thus has a very limited opportunity to cause harm; in this 
paper we refer to such relatively benign events as “soft” 
intrusions. Alternatively, if the MSSP does not possess means 
to detect activities of a particular type of malware – often a 
novel malware or a variation on existing malware that evades 
existing signatures – the cyber attacker is able to execute 
further stages of exploitation and expansion, such as 
delivering additional malware of the same or different type 
into the network, propagating further through the network, 
encrypting data as part of a ransomware attack, or exfiltrating 
information that interests the cyber attacker; in this paper we 
will refer to such intrusions as “hard” intrusions. As the 
malware performs these activities, some may be noticed by 
cyber defenders as suspicious. Eventually, such suspicious 
indicators would accumulate to a point where detailed analysis 
will reveal activities of a malware, and a corresponding means 
of detecting the malware, e.g., a signature or a detailed 
behavioral pattern. Here we use the term signature to refer to 
any means that rapidly reveal activities of a given type of 
malware. 
Having obtained the new signature, MSSP analysts use 
recent as well as previously stored records of network traffic 
and of host-based activities to seek information that matches 
the signature, often resulting in rapid detection of multiple 
related malware instances on the network, and rapid 
generation of multiple intrusion reports. Because such 
intrusions tend to reflect more prolonged and therefore 
potentially more harmful activities, it is worthwhile to 
differentiate these hard-to-detect incidents (“hard” incidents) 
from the relatively easy-to-detect and therefore less harmful 
“soft” incidents. 
Therefore, to oversimplify, the process of detecting 
intrusions can be approximated for modeling purposes by a 
process driven by two broad types of malware and the 
corresponding two types of detection processes: the process of 
soft intrusions that yields a continuous stream of easily 
detected and short-lived individual infections, and a more 
involved process of periodic detection of potentially long-
lived, extensively propagated and dangerous hard infections 
that result in multiple intrusions. In practice, however, it can 
be difficult to distinguish between these two types, and there 
exists a spectrum of intermediate variations between these 
two.  
Even an effective MSSP organization that has a significant 
experience detecting malware on a given network recognizes 
that much of the malware lifecycle remains hidden. Even after 
uncovering and reporting an infection, a MSSP analyst is 
rarely certain about how long the reported malware has been 
present on the network and what have been its past activities. 
Although a detailed cyber-forensic investigation may shed 
light on such questions, it is conducted relatively infrequently 
because of the associated expense and need for scarce forensic 
expertise.  
C. Temporal Features 
As we demonstrate in this paper – to our knowledge for the 
first time with respect to multiple organizations and several 
statistical techniques – the process of detecting malware, like 
many other processes, occurs in a “bursty” fashion. Burstiness 
refers to a tendency of certain events to occur in groups of 
relatively high frequency, i.e., with short inter-event time 
intervals, followed by periods of relatively infrequent events. 
Many processes exhibit some form of burstiness, including 
anthropogenic processes such as sending emails [3] market 
trading [4], watching movies [5], listening to music [6], and 
playing games [7], traffic in computer and communications 
networks [8], [9], and many natural events such as earthquakes 
[10] and neuronal firing [11]. 
Unlike sequences of events formed by strictly memoryless 
random processes – which may also happen to display 
apparent clusters of more frequently occurring events purely 
on the basis of chance – a true bursty process cannot be 
adequately described by a Poisson process with a 
corresponding exponential distribution of statistically 
independent inter-event intervals. Thus, bursty processes may 
be characterized [37] with respect to the degree to which they 
deviate from a Poisson process’s inter-event time distribution. 
Furthermore, the nature of mechanisms that produce 
burstiness in different processes differs widely and is often 
uncertain and subject to disagreements among researchers, see 
e.g., [13]. 
In the later sections of this paper, we use several statistical 
tests, especially the Kolmogorov test [14] and the K-statistic 
of Ripley [15] to confirm burstiness from several perspectives 
and across several different sets of infections. We then 
investigate memory as well as burstiness properties of these 
processes, as described in [37], through the lens of a simple 
two-state mechanism that can be shown to produce similar 
properties in contexts other than cyber security [16]. We 
conclude that the nature of the process under consideration is 
more reminiscent of natural processes such as earthquakes 
than of anthropogenic processes such as sending emails. 
Unlike anthropogenic processes, the process of intrusion 
detection events exhibits strong memory, and the likely 
mechanism of the burstiness in intrusion detection is 
reminiscent of the integrate-and-fire [17] [18] or similar 
threshold [16] phenomenon: knowledge about a new malware 
accumulates to the point until it becomes actionable and 
enables analysts to recognize a particular type of intrusion that 
was previously difficult or impossible to find. At that point, 
the analysts are able to rapidly recognize a number of pre-
existing intrusions within a network(s) under their care and 
produce multiple reports in rapid succession. 
D. Data and Sources 
In this research, we use records of reports produced by a 
MSSP organization that serves multiple organizational 
customers. Each report in our data corresponds to a confirmed 
finding of active malware on a monitored computer, detected 
by automated tools and verified by a human analyst; for this 
analysis, we have ignored other events commonly of interest 
to an MSSP -- such as misconfiguration of devices -- in order 
to focus on malware-related events.  
The data used in this research consist of five sets for the 
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purposes of identifying burstiness, and three of the five sets 
were used for the purposes of constructing a model. Although 
a number of other datasets are available from the same MSSP, 
these five were selected because they have the largest number 
of intrusion reports over the period of observation for which 
consistent records are available. Each set refers to one network 
controlled by one organization –a customer of the MSSP –  for 
a total of five organizations. The organizations differ 
significantly in their business types, geographic locations, 
culture, personnel, operations, cyber-related policies, and 
likely threats. Each set was observed over multiple months, 
and the rates of intrusions differ widely between the networks. 
Table I shows number of records for each network we studied. 
Table II, column "Inter-event time" shows that rates of 
intrusions differ significantly between networks, depending on 
the nature of the business and the defenses of the organization 
that uses each network. 
A set consists of multiple records.  Each record represents 
one report of an intrusion and contains, at a minimum, the 
following information which we use in this research: 
{Identifier of the Network (in our case: A, B, C, D, E, see 
Table I); Date of Report Submission}. The report itself can be 
rather voluminous and describes details of the intrusion, the 
evidence that supports the conclusions of the analyst, and 
recommended actions to resolve this intrusion and to mitigate 
further damage. However, the content of the report is not the 
subject of this research; we focus here only on the timing of a 
report submission, for each of the networks. In all cases, 
reports refer to situations where an actual malware operated on 
the network, as opposed to other types of reportable cyber 
incidents.  
Here, the difference between alerts and reports should be 
mentioned, because these are occasionally confused. An alert 
is generated by an automated intrusion detection tool when it 
detects a suspicious event; the volume of alerts is very high 
and the overwhelming majority of alerts are false positives. 
An incident report is generated by a human, qualified MSSP 
analyst after a due process of analyzing and correlating a large 
number of alerts as well as investigating other pertinent 
information; reports are relatively few and are generally 
believed to be true positives. 
II. PRIOR WORK 
Two distinct bodies of prior work are related to this paper. 
First, we examine prior work on detection of bursting behavior 
in various contexts. The most prominent of these is detection 
of spatially clustered events, and we review methods for 
adapting these techniques to our problem.  Next, we review 
work that examines various properties of bursting behavior 
and memory under the assumption that they are known to exist 
in the model. Our analysis follows a similar trajectory, first 
examining the time series of intrusion detection reports to 
demonstrate the presence of bursting behavior, and then a 
more detailed analysis of it using tools specialized to the task 
of examining burstiness. It is worth emphasizing that we focus 
on an empirical analysis of the intrusion detection process 
using an existing intrusion detection toolset.  It is not the 
purpose of this work to propose a new intrusion detection 
technique. 
A. Approaches to analysis of clustering and burstiness 
Analysis of bursting activity may be viewed as a special 
case of clustering analysis, restricted to a single temporal 
dimension rather than two spatial dimensions. While 
surprisingly few methods directly address the problem of 
detecting and testing for bursting, a wide variety of methods 
have been developed for detecting and analyzing spatial 
clustering, particularly in the geostatistical literature (see, e.g., 
[19], [20], [21], [22], [23]), where the detection problem often 
involves rare events such as uncommon diseases hypothesized 
to be precipitated by some common local cause [24], [25], 
[26], [27]. Due to the complications involved in precisely 
localizing the occurrence of a specific medical incident, much 
of the recent work in that area focuses on mitigating the bias 
inflicted by the need to aggregate over complex, irregular, and 
arbitrary spatial domains (e.g., geographic counties) [19], [22], 
[23], [27], introducing complications that are not germane to 
our problem, in which we have exact observations of arrival 
times of events.  
Cluster analysis can be broadly split into two main 
categories [24]: “focused” and “general.”  In “focused” cluster 
detection, a potential cluster is tested for statistical 
significance. In “general” cluster detection, the isolation of 
specific clusters is set aside in favor of simply determining if 
the overall distribution of points appears to be roughly 
uniform or exhibits clustering. We focus in this paper 
exclusively on the “general” cluster detection problem: 
determining whether or not the process of network security 
incidents exhibits overall bursting behavior – clustering with 
respect to time – rather than determining whether particular 
sequences of events correspond to clusters.  
Our problem is made simpler than many of those presented 
above due to the single dimension of interest (time), and the 
various well-known properties of the null hypotheses we 
investigate (homogenous Poisson process in a single 
dimension). In addition, the availability of exact arrival times 
allows us to avoid using the “general” cluster detection 
algorithms that operate on cluster centroids rather than exact 
location, and instead use methods that are designed to take 
advantage of the extra precision afforded by the exact arrival 
times (as opposed to discretized centroids). The methods we 
focus on are the Kolmogorov test [14] to examine the simplest 
null hypotheses with respect to arrival times, and the K-
function of Ripley [15] with a modification that is similar to 
Besag’s rescaling in the form of the L-function [25]. 
B. Prior work on burstiness 
An extensive literature explores burstiness in a wide range 
of processes other than intrusion detection process; [16] and 
[37] are two examples of that literature. With respect to 
intrusion detection, a number of authors explore bursts from a 
very different perspective than in this paper. Many researchers 
[28], [29], [30], [31], report intrusion detection techniques that 
use bursts of network traffic, bursts of connection requests, or 
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bursts of login attempts as indicators of malicious activities. 
Similarly, bursts of messages may be indicative of spam 
campaigns [32]. Others investigate the negative impact that 
bursts of network traffic have on the accuracy of anomaly 
detection [33] or on the possibility that the intrusion detection 
tools may be unable to cope with an extremely high rate of 
alerts when they arrive in a major burst [2], [34]. Others 
propose effective approaches to handling and aggregating 
bursts of alerts [33], [35]. These works, however, do not 
address the burstiness in the intrusion detection process itself.  
Very little prior work has been directed specifically to the 
burstiness of the intrusion detection process. A single paper 
[36] notes that infections exhibit burstiness and use a 
technique called Allan deviation to demonstrate this fact in 
application to one large set of infections observed on a 
network.  Unlike prior work, in this paper we demonstrate, 
with strong empirical evidence that involves data from 
multiple organizations and use of several statistical 
techniques, the burstiness in the process of detecting infections 
effected by cyber threats against networks of large 
organizations. We also propose – for the first time, to our 
knowledge – a hypothetical mechanism for explaining the 
burstiness and a model that produces plausible parameters 
when fitted to the observed values. 
III. EVIDENCE OF BURSTINESS 
To evaluate the presence of bursting behavior in the data 
obtained from the MSSP customer organizations (as described 
above), we extracted the time series of intrusion times 
(“events”) and subjected them to the following tests. Initially, 
we perform Kolmogorov testing on both the arrival times and 
the inter-event times (lags between successive events) under a 
simple null hypothesis. We then use the tests of [15] and [37] 
to evaluate, in turn, the temporal distribution of the discrete 
events and the distribution – both with and without ordering – 
of the inter-event times, to evaluate the two aspects of the data 
separately. We provide parametric p-values, where possible 
and Monte Carlo results otherwise. Event counts for the data 
over the collection interval are provided in Table I, below. 
Details on the exact timing of events and the interval over 
which they were collected are beyond the scope of this paper.  
As the number of observations varies between networks 
(see Table I), we emphasize the use of formal statistical 
methods with significance testing, which controls for the 
possibility of spurious results due to a combination of chance 
and a lack of data.  
 
A. Kolmogorov tests for arrival and inter-event times 
Here we present the first test of burstiness found in our data. 
The simplest null hypothesis is simply that of a homogenous 
Poisson process over the observed time interval. Formally, we 
have some constant λ such that for any continuous interval T = 
(t0,t1), the number of events XT in that interval is distributed as 
a Poisson random variable with parameter λ × (t1-t0). The 
various distributional properties of this stochastic process are 
well known (see e.g. [38]), and may be directly tested for 
statistical significance via the Kolmogorov test. 
Specifically, for an observation from a homogenous Poisson 
process taken on a bounded interval, the following three 
properties must all hold: 
1. Conditional on the number of events within the 
interval, the arrival times of those events are 
uniformly distributed on the interval. 
2. The inter-event times between successive events 
are independently and exponentially distributed. 
3. For any given partitioning of the interval, each 
sub-interval (ti, ti+1) has a number of events that are 
also Poisson distributed, with parameter λ × (ti, 
ti+1) 
We examine the first two of these properties and conclude 
that they do not hold, and as such, the null hypothesis of a 
homogenous Poisson process cannot hold (examination of the 
third is redundant in the face of the first two not holding, and 
leaving it aside allows us to avoid the more complex problem 
of examining all possible partitions of the data).  
 
Table II shows the results of testing against the null 
hypothesis of a homogenous Poisson process for the five 
networks evaluated. Results significant at a level of p≤0.001 
have been emphasized in bold font. For the parameterization 
of null distribution for the inter-event time, the maximum 
likelihood estimator (the mean number of events per unit time) 
was used. While the results do show that for two of the 
networks (A and C) we clearly cannot reject the null 
hypothesis of a homogenous Poisson process, there are 
important caveats. 
First, we reiterate that a failure to reject the null hypothesis 
does not immediately entail that the null hypothesis is true; 
simply that it was not falsified. We note that there appears to 
be a loose correlation between the count for a network and the 
p-value observed; this suggests that we may simply have 
accumulated insufficient data to falsify the hypothesis of 
homogeneity, particularly for network A. 
Second, and more importantly, even a statistically 
significant result in these tests does not directly indicate 
clustering, as it does not exclude other alternatives such as an 
TABLE II 
RESULTS FROM KOLMOGOROV TESTS 
Network Count Arrival time (test stat,  p-value) 
Inter-event time  
(test stat,  p-value) 
A 51 0.2062,   0.02224 0.1455,  0.2180 
B 916 0.08115,  0.00001074 0.2037,  <1.0e-12 
C 77 0.1541,  0.04608 0.1680, 0.02415 
D 168 0.1679,  0.0001304 0.1802, 0.00003238 
E 718 0.08177,  0.0001266 0.2166,  <1.0e-12 
 
TABLE I 
DATA SUMMARY 
Network Number of events 
A 51 
B 916 
C 77 
D 168 
E 718 
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inhomogeneous Poisson process with a piecewise constant 
intensity function. It simply demonstrates that the hypothesis 
of a homogenous Poisson process is – with high likelihood – 
incompatible with the observed data. 
Finally, although evidence of burstiness is strong for at least 
some of the networks we have investigated, it does not mean 
that burstiness is always present, or can be observed in all 
networks and in all intrusion detection processes. In other 
words, we show that burstiness is present in some cases, but 
not necessarily in all cases. It is entirely possible that there 
may exist classes of networks, and/or associated intrusion 
processes, and intrusion detection processes where burstiness 
is either absent in principle, or cannot be detected from the 
available data.   As noted above, all the networks in this study 
bear stronger resemblance to corporate or institutional 
networks than to e.g. residential or academic networks; as 
such the conclusions that we reach may not apply to such 
networks.  The fact that we observe such strong evidence of 
bursting in 3 of the 5 networks we have examined, however, 
leads us to suspect that this phenomenon is prevalent in many 
if not most high-volume networks. Identifying conditions 
under which burstiness exists, and can be observed, is a topic 
of future research. 
 
B. Ripley’s K-function 
We now perform the second test of busrtiness; we explore 
the question of clustering in the temporal domain more 
directly by examining the distribution of arrival times using a 
variant of Ripley’s K-function [15] adapted to a single 
dimension. Ripley’s K-function is defined as 
 
𝐾𝐾(𝑡𝑡) = 1
𝜆𝜆
𝐸𝐸�#�𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗: �𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗� ≤ 𝑡𝑡�� 
 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 and 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 are the arrival times of the 𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡ℎ  and 𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡ℎ event, 
respectively. The #{𝐴𝐴} denotes the cardinality of set {𝐴𝐴}, and 
𝐸𝐸  is the expected value operator, thus we compute the 
expectation (with respect to 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖) of the number of events 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 
that occur within some interval 𝑡𝑡 of 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖.  This value is then 
normalized by 𝜆𝜆, the average intensity (events per unit 
measure) of the total process.  
Intuitively, the K-function estimates the tendency of the 
process that generates events 𝑋𝑋1,𝑋𝑋2, … to cluster within some 
smoothing window t. If the data exhibit clustering within some 
radius t, then the value of the K-function in the vicinity of t 
will be elevated, as the expected number of events within a 
span of 𝑡𝑡 from any arbitrary event 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 will be above 𝜆𝜆. The 
values of t for which the K-function remains elevated provide 
an indication of the scale at which the bursting or clustering 
occurs. The K-function is most commonly used in 
geostatistics, where the measure of the Poisson process is 
defined on a two-dimensional domain. As our domain is 
different, we derive comparable statistics for our domain. 
First, define the number of events within some window of 
size 𝑡𝑡 of some given time point 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 by 𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡), which we may 
calculate as 𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , t) = #�𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗: �𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 − 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗� ≤ 𝑡𝑡� where 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ranges 
over the set of all other events. Note that, under the 
assumption of a homogenous Poisson process, we have that 
𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡𝑡) ∼ Poisson(2𝜆𝜆t). It immediately follows that 
𝐾𝐾𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚(𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)− 2𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡√𝑡𝑡  will have zero mean and variance 2𝜆𝜆. 
As the mean and variance are finite, we may apply the central 
limit theorem to find that 1
𝑁𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐶
(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)− 2𝜆𝜆𝑡𝑡
√𝑡𝑡
 will be asymptotically 
normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2𝜆𝜆/𝑁𝑁 for 
sufficiently large number of observations 𝑁𝑁.  
While precise details are beyond the scope of this paper, we 
note the following results: 
1. We observe significant indications of clustering 
under the K-statistic (p-value of <0.001, using the 
Gaussian approximation above) for all five time 
series when considering intervals on the order of 1-
4 days. 
2. For networks B, D, and E, where we have a larger 
number of observations, but not networks A and B, 
we observe clustering over even larger windows, 
again suggesting a correlation between the amount 
of available data and our ability to detect 
clustering. 
 
C. Inter-event analysis using burstiness and memory 
parameters 
Our third test of burstiness involves an analysis of the 
distribution of inter-event times. We apply the method of [37] 
to the data to calculate clustering coefficients for all five 
networks. In particular, we parameterize bursting behavior in 
terms of a ‘memory’ parameter μ – loosely, the degree to 
which there is serial autocorrelation in the event interarrival 
times – and ‘burstiness’ Δ parameter, which characterizes the 
degree and manner in which the statistics of interarrival times 
differs from that suggested by a Poisson process. Due to the 
discrete nature of our data, generating a continuous density 
estimate for the inter-event times was impractical; we instead 
 
Fig. 1. Plot of inter-event distributions for networks B and E (the two largest 
data sets with the most obvious bursting behavior), normalized by average 
rate τ0 to lie on same scale; the distribution for an exponential distribution is 
given as a dashed line. See Figure 2A in [37] for comparison. The points 
lying above the dashed line indicate a “fat tail” of longer inter-event times 
than expected under an exponential distribution of inter-event times that 
corresponds to a Poisson process. 
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binned the data in √𝑛𝑛 bins, calculated the corresponding 
interval probability directly under an assumed exponential 
distribution via the cumulative distribution function (CDF), 
and took the differences across intervals. As statistical tests 
are not developed in [37] due to the difficulty of clearly 
identifying the distribution of their test statistic, and are likely 
not feasible due to our transformation of the data, we instead 
apply a simple Monte Carlo test (not to be confused with the 
MCMC methods we use to fit the model later in the paper) in 
which the null hypothesis of a homogenous Poisson process 
with the MLE rate (as above, the mean number of events per 
unit time over the length of the data) was used. Ten thousand 
sample trajectories were generated for each network, and 
memory μ and burstiness Δ were calculated for each trajectory 
separately; upper and lower 95% limits were obtained from 
the empirical distribution thus generated and are reported in 
Table III. An asterisk denotes that the observed value fell 
outside of the 95% range of values observed in the Monte 
Carlo trials, suggesting that the observed value displays 
statistically significant burstiness and memory compared to a 
homogenous Poisson process generated from the same rate 
parameter. 
 
  
The two largest data sets (B and E) with the most obvious 
bursting behavior show significance under the Monte Carlo 
test (as the observed value for the data is outside the range of 
values observed in the most common 95% of the simulated 
trials). Figure 1 displays the plot of the estimated density for 
the inter-event times of network B and E against an 
exponential distribution, normalized to a common scale (see 
also Figure 2A in [37]). The long-tailed nature of the inter-
event distribution (relative to an exponential distribution 
corresponding to the homogeneous Poisson process) for both 
networks is readily visible. While the log-scaling reduces the 
relative counts in the smaller bins, there is some indication for 
both networks that a slight excess of shorter waiting times is 
observable as well. 
 
 It is interesting to note that set D (which had a highly 
significant p-value under the Kolmogorov test) does not 
exhibit significance under this metric, while C (which had 
only a marginally significant p-value under the Kolmogorov 
test) does show significance under the Monte Carlo test for the 
burstiness test statistic. This suggests that network E may not 
exhibit strong bursting behavior, despite both arrival and inter-
event times not following the distributions associated with a 
Poisson process, while the marginal statistical significance for 
network C under the Kolmogorov test may be simply a 
function of sample size.  
In Figure 2, we reproduce Figure 4b of [37] with our data 
superimposed in the form of green four-pointed stars. It is 
worth remarking that all three networks that (B,C, and E) 
displayed significant burstiness and memory values under the 
Monte Carlo test appear to be very nearly in the same range as 
the “natural phenomena” (earthquake and precipitation 
records) observed in [37]. While the remaining two points (A 
and D) appear to cluster separately, numerical experimentation 
(data not shown) suggests that the magnitude of both 
parameters can be extremely variable at low sample sizes; this 
may be observed in Table III by comparing the number of 
observations with the 95% windows for Δ and μ. Additional 
data are required to determine if these two points truly are 
forming a separate cluster indicative of a separate mode of 
network infection that does not show characteristics of a 
natural process, or if they will – given sufficient data – move 
to an existing cluster. However, the grouping of the process of 
some network security incidents with natural events rather 
than either anthropogenic events or purely random events 
nevertheless suggests the intriguing possibility that some 
fundamental law may serve a limit to the process of exploiting 
networks under some circumstances. 
TABLE III 
BURSTINESS AND MEMORY PARAMETERS 
Network Observations Burstiness (Δ) Memory (𝜇𝜇) 95% MC Range for 
Δ 
95% MC  
Range for 𝜇𝜇 
A 51 0.1015 0.03103 -0.1865 to 
0.1758 
-0.2592 to 
0.2599 
B 916 0.1726* 0.2022* -0.06856 
to 0.06633 
-0.06307 to 
0.06557 
C 77 0.1551* 0.2281* -0.1600 to 
0.1428 
-0.2092 to 
0.2170 
D 168 0.0866 0.0890 -0.1215 to 
0.1130 
-0.1479 to 
0.1513 
E 718 0.2002* 0.1330* -0.07417 
to 0.07176 
-0.07160 to 
0.07299 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Reproduced from 3b Goh and Barabasi [37] with our data 
superimposed as 4-pointed stars and labeled by network. According to [37] 
the region highlighted in red is associated with “human activity” (email, 
library loans, printing); the area in gray is associated with natural phenomena 
(rainfall, earthquakes). Our data trend towards the gray area, i.e., natural 
phenomena. 
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Combined with the results obtained from the Kolmogorov 
testing and examination of the K-statistic, above, we conclude 
that there is extremely strong evidence of clustering in 
networks B, and E, somewhat less strong but still very 
compelling evidence for burstiness in network C, and marginal 
evidence for networks D and A. While all networks displayed 
some degree of temporal clustering, and only network A had a 
clearly non-significant Kolmogorov test result, the burstiness 
and memory parameters are less clearly distinguishable for 
networks D and A (see Table IV that summarizes all results of 
tests, with “+” for evidence for burstiness and “-“ otherwise.).  
It should be noted that the highlighted regions are not 
indicators of e.g. statistical significance, but rather 
approximate regions for particular types of processes 
identified in Goh and Barabasi [37].  The main item of interest 
is that – to the degree that the points deviate from 
memoryless/non-bursting processes – they do so in a manner 
that is more reflective of natural processes than human-
generated ones.  
We once again note that there seems to be some degree of 
correlation between the number of observations available for a 
network and the power of the associated tests. One may 
conjecture that burstiness can be detected only when the 
number the number of observations is sufficiently high. 
Identifying conditions (such as the required number of 
observations) under which burstiness can be detected is a topic 
of future research. 
D. A Hypothetical Mechanism of the Burstiness 
We hypothesize that the mechanism of burstiness has to do 
with what we call a threshold of analyst knowledge. As 
conjectured in [16], the common element of various bursty 
processes – even if very different in nature – is a threshold 
mechanism, i.e., events occur infrequently until some domain-
specific quantity accumulates to a threshold value, at which 
point the events “burst out” at a high frequency.  
Intriguingly, cyber analysts recalled episodes when multiple 
discoveries of intrusions (and corresponding reports) are made 
after arrival of a crucial piece of new information about a 
previously unknown malware behavior or characteristic. This 
new information enables analysts to recognize a particular 
type of intrusion that until then was difficult or impossible to 
find. At that point, the analysts are able to rapidly recognize a 
number of pre-existing infections within a network(s) under 
their care and produce multiple reports in rapid succession.  
Clearly, this is a kind of threshold mechanism, where the 
available knowledge of analysts must reach a certain critical 
value before enabling a burst of new discovery events.  As 
shown in [37], processes with obvious threshold mechanisms, 
such as earthquakes, exhibit strong memory (see Figure 2 for 
illustration). In our data, we notice that the intrusion detection 
process also tends towards higher values of the memory 
parameter (see points E, B, and C in Figure2).  This could be 
interpreted as a support to the hypothesis that the busrtiness in 
the intrusion detection process is also associated with a 
threshold mechanism. Although we do not know if this 
mechanism is the only, or even the primary one responsible 
for burstiness, it can serve as a working hypothesis and a 
motivation for the modeling approach we consider next. 
IV. MODELING THE BURSTY PROCESS 
Having established that burstiness is clearly present in 
networks with a larger number of observations, and at least 
plausibly present in the rest, we turn our attention to 
attempting to model this phenomenon. 
We examine a general class of models that is a slight 
modification of that presented in [16]. The discrete model 
presented in [16] considers the system to be in one of two 
states – “normal” or “excited” – at all times. In the context of 
our domain, the normal state is when the MSSP detects only 
soft intrusions, while the excited state is when the MSSP 
analysts obtain a signature for a new type of malware and 
begin discovery of hard intrusions – often multiple – in rapid 
succession, leading to a burst of reports. In both states, the 
waiting time between successive events is generated by a 
long-tailed discrete distribution, in which the probability of 
waiting for one additional unit of time conditional on having 
waited for time 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 since the previous event is given by: 
 
𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = � 𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+1�𝜇𝜇𝑠𝑠, 
 
where μs is the reinforcement parameter for the current state.  
When the system is in the normal state, it waits for the time 
induced by f prior to emitting another event, and then with 
some fixed probability transitions to the excited state. The 
excited state introduces another long-tailed function p(n) – 
with form essentially identical to f(tie) above – which governs 
the probability of emitting another event in the excited state 
conditional on having emitted n events so far. Note that the 
value of f approaches 1 as the argument grows, indicating a 
self-reinforcing property by which the likelihood of waiting 
additional time before emitting another event grows as the 
time since the last event increases. This behavior is modulated 
by the parameter μs, which for values greater than 1 will 
reduce the probability of waiting an additional unit of time 
across all inter-event times. 
While this two-state model is a very coarse representation 
of the underlying process of intrusion detection and does not, 
for example, distinguish between different varieties of 
malware or categories of detection tools, models of this kind 
have been extensively studied in the context of bursty systems 
[16], and are thus reasonable to use as a model of the 
phenomenon we are attempting to study.   
The physical intuition of the two-state model is as follows: 
TABLE IV 
SUMMARY OF TESTING RESULTS 
Network Observations Kolmogorov test 
K-
statistic 
Burstiness 
MC test 
Memory 
MC test 
A 51 - + - - 
B 916 + + + + 
C 77 Marginal + + + + 
D 168 + + - - 
E 718 + + + + 
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in our interpretation, the normal state is the state in which the 
network defenders observe the easy-to-detect intrusions, using 
the available detection techniques (see the discussion of the 
hypothetical mechanism of burstiness in section III.D). 
Meanwhile, a malware for which the detection techniques is 
yet unknown keeps accumulating within the network. 
Eventually, sufficient number of observations and other 
knowledge about the hard-to-detect type of malware leads to 
the discovery of a detection technique for the malware. This 
creates the excited state, i.e., the state in which the defenders 
of the network are actively uncovering multiple “hard” 
infections using the newly found technique. This corresponds 
to the “feast or famine” pattern of activity anecdotally reported 
by MSSP analysts, in which periods of normal activity are 
interrupted by bursts of high activity when novel infections are 
discovered. A physical analogy could be drawn to earthquakes 
-- explored using the two-state model in [16] -- in which strain 
around the fault surface (in our example, accumulation of 
infections and associated indicators) accumulates to some 
critical point (in our case, the point of discovering a detection 
technique), whereupon it is discharged through a series of 
earthquakes and aftershocks (in our case, detections of 
malware). 
In order to model the continuous-time nature of our data, we 
further modify the discrete model of [16] to a continuous time 
version. Due to the nonconvergence of the integrals of 
functions of the kind investigated in [16] when considered on 
the non-negative real numbers, we moderate the long-tailed 
behavior by making the incremental probabilities constant – 
i.e., exponential waiting times between events. The state 
remains continuous; analogously to our constant-increment 
modification for waiting times, we make the incremental state 
probabilities constant as well, thus inducing a geometric 
distribution on the number of events fired from the excited 
state. 
The simplified system with continuous time and discrete 
state thus obeys the following dynamics:  the inter-event times 
are exponentially distributed with parameter λs, while the 
number of emissions in each state are geometrically 
distributed with parameter ps, where s indexes the current 
state. Given observable events, we can construct it as a hidden 
Markov model (HMM) in continuous time, where the state of 
the system (normal or excited) is hidden, and all other factors 
(most importantly inter-event times) are observed. In standard 
probabilistic graphical model notation [39], we write the 
following: 
 
Where Sn denotes the state after the nth emission event, i.e., in 
our case an issuance of an incident report, while Tn denotes the 
time between emission event n and n-1, and so the smallest n 
for which Tn is defined is T2. We observe {𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛}𝑁𝑁=2𝑁𝑁 , from which 
we attempt to infer the remaining parameters. Note the change 
in discretization between the model above and the model of 
[16]; while they consider a model that is discrete in both time 
and state, we allow the model to run in continuous time, and 
exploit the discretization of state and observed emission times 
to render the model tractable. 
Such models are readily estimated by standard methods [40] 
however note that due to the symmetry between states, such 
systems may not have a unique parameterization. For this 
reason, when fitting the model to observed data (Section IV.) 
we use Bayesian methods with informative priors to ensure 
that the normal state is associated with lower rates of activity 
than the excited state.  
V. FITTING THE MODEL 
Having defined the two-state model we consider methods to 
fit the parameters of the model to the observed data. The 
simplicity of the two-state model, along with the strict 
dependence of the inter-event times on the (unobserved) state 
of the model, places it firmly within the class of hidden 
Markov models, for which a wide range of fitting approaches 
apply. We focus here on a Bayesian approach, and briefly 
derive a Gibbs sampling scheme for the model. 
Under our continuous parameterization of the two-state 
model where Si=1 denotes the excited state, with λ1 the 
associated rate parameter (and similarly for Si=0 for the 
normal state), we define pi as the probability of being in the 
excited state after the next event emission in state I (i.e., the 
transition probability for the normal state, and the complement 
of the transition probability for the excited state), and Ti the 
inter-event time between observation i and i-1, estimating the 
posterior distributions for it through Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) [40] techniques is straightforward. The 
factorization of the joint likelihood becomes: 
 
𝑃𝑃({𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=1..𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆0, 𝜆𝜆0, 𝜆𝜆1𝑝𝑝0, 𝑝𝑝1)= 𝑃𝑃({𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=1..𝑁𝑁 , 𝑆𝑆0|𝜆𝜆0, 𝜆𝜆1, 𝑝𝑝0, 𝑝𝑝1) 𝑃𝑃(𝜆𝜆0)𝑃𝑃(𝜆𝜆1)𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝0)𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝1) 
 
Where: 
𝑃𝑃({𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=1..𝑁𝑁 , 𝑆𝑆0|𝜆𝜆0, 𝜆𝜆1, 𝑝𝑝0, 𝑝𝑝1)=  𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆0) �𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−1)𝑃𝑃(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖)𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
 
 
(We suppress dependence on the parameters λi and pi where it 
is clear from context.)  Less formally, we can compute the 
total likelihood of any given sequence by first computing the 
probability of the initial state (𝑆𝑆0); the interarrival time of the 
first event (𝑇𝑇1) then depends upon that state (excited or 
normal), and the transition to the next state depends on 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 .  By 
stepping through the model, we may compute the total 
likelihood of a given sequence of states and interarrival times 
given the state transition probabilities and the rate constants 
associated with each state, and thus find a parameterization (or 
set of parameterizations) that maximize the observed 
 
 
Fig. 3. Dependence diagram for the two-state model. 
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likelihood under this model.  However, we only have 
observations on the {Ti} values, and wish to find the posterior 
distribution: 
𝑃𝑃(𝜆𝜆0, 𝜆𝜆1, 𝑝𝑝0, 𝑝𝑝1|𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖) =
∫
𝑃𝑃�{𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 , 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=1..𝑁𝑁 , 𝑆𝑆0�𝜆𝜆0, 𝜆𝜆1, 𝑝𝑝0, 𝑝𝑝1� 𝑃𝑃(𝜆𝜆0)𝑃𝑃(𝜆𝜆1)𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝0)𝑃𝑃(𝑝𝑝1)
𝑃𝑃({𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖}𝑖𝑖=1..𝑁𝑁,𝑆𝑆0){𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖}  (1) 
 
Or – again informally – we wish to estimate the distribution 
of the rate parameters and transition probabilities conditional 
on the observed data, which does not include information on 
the states 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖. Intuitively, we may guess that periods in which 
the interarrival time is generally large may correspond to a 
‘normal’ state, and periods in which it is short may correspond 
to an ‘excited’ state; given those assumptions we may estimate 
both the rate at which the model emits events in both of those 
states, as well as the probability of transitioning from one state 
to the other after each event.  By use of MCMC techniques we 
may formalize this intuitive approach into a strategy by which 
we may estimate the distribution of parameters we are 
interested in via sampling. 
We have the assumed transition probabilities from excited 
to normal and back are given by: 
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1 = 1|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗) = 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 
𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1 = 0|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗) = 1 − 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗  
And the interarrival times for a given state are generated by: 
𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖|𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−1 ∼ 𝐸𝐸𝑥𝑥𝑝𝑝�𝜆𝜆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−1� 
For the unknown parameters, we use conjugate priors for 
simplicity: 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ∼ 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝐵𝐵(1,1) 
𝜆𝜆0 ∼ 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵(1,2) 
𝜆𝜆1 ∼ 𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵(3,2) 
 
The prior on pi is uninformative, allowing us to avoid any 
strong bias on the posterior estimate. The priors on λi are weak 
but informative to ensure that the excited component has a 
higher rate on average than the normal component. This 
avoids issues that can arise with bi-stable configurations when 
using Gibbs sampling. 
This factorization makes it clear that conditional on the 
values of Ti+1, Si-1, and Si+1, we may calculate unnormalized 
likelihoods for 𝑃𝑃(𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = 1│𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−1, 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖) and P(Si=0│Ti+1, Si-1, 
Si) with relative ease. As Si ∈ {0,1}∀i , these un-normalized 
likelihoods may be easily normalized and thus sampled from. 
Given the sequence of states {Si}, the conditional posteriors 
for pi and 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖  are even more straightforward to calculate and 
thus sample from. Finally, given the state assignments {Si} 
and the inter-event observation times {Ti}, we may re-estimate 
the conditional posteriors for λi and sample from those as well. 
This immediately suggests a Gibbs sampling strategy, in 
which we first sample each Si individually given the 
observation 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖+1 and the current samples values of 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖−1 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖+1, 
pi and λi, and then re-sample the now conditionally 
independent parameters λ0, λ1, p0, and p1 conditional on the 
new sample for {Si}. Note that the likelihoods for S0 and SN 
require corrections for edge effects, however this correction is 
straightforward. By alternating these two sampling blocks, we 
may produce a MCMC estimate of the unknown parameters, 
including {Si}. By ignoring the portions of the samples 
involving {Si}, we effectively perform a stochastic version of 
the integration in equation 1, thus obtaining a sample from the 
posterior distribution of interest.  For more complete details 
about Gibbs schemes in general, we refer interested readers to 
the excellent introduction provided by Gelman [40]. 
When fitting the data, we start a total of ten chains from 
random initial conditions, drew 5000 samples; convergence 
was assessed by the Gelman-Rubin diagnostic [41]. On the 
basis of this diagnostic, the first 1500 samples were discarded 
from each run as burn-in, and the remaining samples pooled 
into a single set of estimators for a total of 35000 samples. 
Detailed results and discussion are provided in section VI. 
 
VI. RESULTS 
An example fit of data from a single network using the two-
state model is shown in Figure 4. Loosely, in the top plot of 
Figure 4, each point denotes a combination of event rates in 
normal (x-axis) and excited (y-states) that might explain the 
observed data. Intuitively, the area of the plot with the highest 
density of the points represents the most likely “correct” 
combination of event rates in the two states. Similarly, in the 
bottom plot of Figure 4, each point represents the combination 
of switching probabilities that might explain the observed 
sequence of events: from normal to excited state (x-axis), and 
from excited to normal state (y-axis).  
Due to the large number of samples, we have thinned the 
data by sampling every 35th point in order to obtain the 1000 
samples shown in the figures; this was done solely to avoid 
clutter in plotting, and the full data set was used in numerical 
analysis. Rate parameters for the ‘normal’ and ‘excited’ states 
are jointly plotted in the top panel, along with histograms over 
marginal distributions, allowing us to examine both the joint 
and marginal distribution of these parameters.  
 
We see that the rates for the normal state (x-axis) 
concentrate about a rate of approximately 0.007: up to an 
order of magnitude smaller than in the excited state (y-axis) 
which concentrated about a rate of 0.05. Recall that according 
to our hypothesis of section III-D applied to the two-state 
model (discussion in section IV), the interpretation of the 
normal state is that it represents a period when mainly easy-to-
detect “soft” events are detected and recorded; and the 
interpretation of the excited state is that it represents a period 
when intrusion detection analysts obtain a new “signature” 
that enables detection of a number of pre-existing “hard” 
infections within a network(s) under their care and produce 
multiple reports in rapid succession. It should be noted that 
this fitting process does not tell us whether any particular 
intrusions are “hard” or “soft.” Instead, it characterizes the 
overall process of intrusion detection observed for a given 
network, such as rates of detection reports and probabilities of 
switching for both states. 
The switching probabilities (p0 and 1-p1) are shown in the 
bottom panel. The trends are similar, with strong correlation 
between the switching probabilities in all three plots. The 
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switching probability for the excited states (y-axis) have mode 
and mean values uniformly close to zero, indicating strong 
persistence in the excited states, while the switching 
probabilities in the normal state are much more diffuse, 
suggesting a wider range of uncertainty about the parameter.  
Similar results can be observed across all organizations, and 
are consistent with visual inspection of the data: bursts – 
produced when the model transitions from a normal to excited 
state – tend to produce a larger number of events at a higher 
rate than in the normal state. Fewer events are produced in the 
normal state (reflected in the higher switching probability for 
that state), however the much lower rate parameter results in 
substantially larger time intervals between successive events 
in that state, with higher variance. 
This two-state model is simple, and reflects an inherently 
limited bimodal process. Therefore, it may have difficulties in 
modeling, e.g., a new campaign of easily detectible malware 
which may raise the detection rate to an intermediate point. On 
the other hand, the model offers the ability to factorize it into a 
Gibbs sampler – as discussed in the previous section – and 
thereby makes it direct to fit and evaluate convergence of the 
fitting process. It also does not impose – in our experience 
with this model – excessive computational requirements to run 
in a generative fashion.  
The fitting takes little time (e.g., on the order of minutes on a 
commodity desktop computer using 3GHz quad-core Intel 
processors), and can be accomplished even with a small 
number of data points (although the accuracy of the resulting 
parametrization may be doubtful). For all data sets, the two-
state model yields plausible values of parameters with which it 
produces report-generation trajectories closely matching the 
actually observed data. It would be desirable to compare this 
model with alternative models, especially those proposed in 
prior work. However, to our knowledge, the prior work on 
burstiness in the intrusion detection process consists of a 
single paper [36]. In that paper, no model has been proposed. 
To our knowledge, the model proposed in our paper is the first 
model of this particular phenomenon. For that reason, we are 
unable to compare our model to any other model. 
The model is not intended to provide a new approach to 
intrusion detection. Instead, it can be used to estimate the 
likely variations in work load related to a given network, a 
useful information for a MSSP manager. It also provides a 
rough indication of how many of the network's intrusions are 
of the benign "soft" nature as opposed to hard-to-detect, more 
dangerous “hard” intrusions. In that sense, it could be used 
towards a metric of risk, and for characterizing the nature of 
threats to the network. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first demonstration, 
with strong empirical evidence that involves data from 
multiple organizations and use of several statistical 
techniques, of burstiness in the process of detecting infections 
effected by cyber threats against networks of large 
organizations. Testing the arrival and inter-arrival times of the 
time series via the Kolmogorov test shows that in three of the 
five organizations, this distribution clearly violates a Poisson 
process, with p-values of less than 0.001, while a fourth 
organization has weaker p-values of <0.05 for each. The final 
organization has a p-value of 0.02 for the distribution of 
arrival times, however the distribution of interarrival times is 
not significant at a p-value of 0.222. Examining a variant of 
the K-statistic across a range of scales shows that the rate at 
 
 
Fig. 4. Joint plots for rate parameters (top) and switching parameters 
(bottom) for the two-state model of a single network. Rates are 
given against an arbitrary time scale; probabilities are rendered as 
fit. 
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which observations cluster in all five data sets is significantly 
higher than that of the null model (Poisson process). Finally, 
estimating p-values via Monte Carlo simulation for the 
memory and burstiness parameters shows that three of the five 
time series display marked deviations from the null model for 
both statistics. Although the burstiness is less pronounced in 
some cases, it is highly visible in all tests performed on the 
two largest datasets that cover the largest number of 
infections.  
However, we do not conclude that burstiness is always 
present, in a general case, or can be observed in all networks 
and in all intrusion detection processes. In other words, we 
only show that burstiness is present in some cases, but not 
necessarily in all generic cases. It is entirely possible that there 
may exist classes of networks, and/or associated intrusion 
processes, and intrusion detection processes where burstiness 
is either absent in principle, or cannot be detected from the 
available data. Identifying conditions under which burstiness 
exists, and can be observed, is a topic of future research. 
Burstiness and memory parameters suggest that the nature of 
the process under considerations is more reminiscent of 
natural processes such as earthquakes than of anthropogenic 
processes such as sending emails. Unlike anthropogenic 
processes, intrusion detection exhibits strong memory. We 
propose the hypothetical mechanism – the Analyst Knowledge 
Threshold – of the burstiness we observe in intrusion 
detection.  
We have developed a two-state model that yields plausible 
values of parameters with which it produces report-generation 
trajectories closely matching the actually observed data. The 
model can be used to estimate the likely variations in work 
load related to a given network, a useful information for a 
MSSP manager. It also provides a rough indication of how 
many of the network's intrusions are of the “soft" nature as 
opposed to “hard”, more dangerous malware. In that sense, it 
could be used towards a metric of risk to the network. 
While the simple two-state model presented here provides 
some insight into the process of network intrusions, it remains 
a highly idealized and very rough approximation. In particular, 
it does not account for variation in the rates of undetected 
spread of internal infections, or relative ease of detection of 
different variants. In the future, we plan to augment the model 
with latent variables that can model such infection-to-infection 
variability with higher fidelity. 
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